South Africa’s First Five Years on the United Nations Human Rights Council by JORDAAN, Eduard Christiaan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
12-2012
South Africa’s First Five Years on the United
Nations Human Rights Council
Eduard Christiaan JORDAAN
Singapore Management University, ejordaan@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
JORDAAN, Eduard Christiaan, "South Africa’s First Five Years on the United Nations Human Rights Council" (2012). Research
Collection School of Social Sciences. Paper 1167.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1167
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/1167
Eduard Jordaan * 
  
 
Physical Address:  
2nd floor, B2, Park Lane, Corner of Park & Alexandra 
Roads, Pinelands, Cape Town, South Africa, 7405 
Tel: + 27 21 511 1679 
Fax: + 27 21 511 5058 
E-Mail: sanusha@ct.osf.org.za 
Postal Address:  
P.O. Box 143, Howard Place, Pinelands,  
Cape Town, South Africa, 7430 
 
SAFPI Policy Brief No 17 
December 2012 
South Africa’s first five years on the United Nations Human 
Rights Council 
Introduction 
 
In June 2011, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (HRC) adopted its first resolution on 
sexual orientation and human rights. Resolution 
17/19 expressed grave concern at violence and 
discrimination committed against people because 
of their sexual orientation and tasked the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to report on 
such abuses. In a body marred by regional bloc 
voting, Resolution 17/19 passed with support 
from states in all five of the official regions of the 
UN. South Africa was widely praised for leading 
such a progressive resolution through the 
Council, especially in the face of considerable 
pressure from African and Islamic states. 
 
South Africa’s leadership on Resolution 17/19 
was a surprise because a few months earlier 
South Africa was still obstructing the Council’s 
ability to address the human rights aspects of 
sexual orientation. In March 2011, South Africa 
presented a draft resolution to create a committee 
to define ‘sexual orientation’ and to investigate 
the concept’s fit in international human rights law. 
The need to define ‘sexual orientation’ seems to 
have been in response to claims by Nigeria and 
others that the concept was ill-defined. South 
Africa’s draft resolution sought to confine 
discussion of sexual orientation to the proposed 
committee. Thus, while appearing to support a 
progressive cause, South Africa was in fact trying 
to stall action on the issue, because adoption of 
the draft resolution would have meant that no 
wider discussion on matters related to sexual 
orientation would be permitted until the meaning 
and application of sexual orientation had been 
defined. In response, the United States 
threatened to present its own draft, yet it was 
mostly due to pressure from civil society that 
South Africa changed course and presented a 
much improved resolution in June 2011. 
 
South Africa’s role in the final sexual orientation 
resolution was also surprising when viewed 
against the wider background of the country’s 
participation in the HRC. During the four years 
South Africa spent as a member of the Council 
(2006-10) as well as during its subsequent 
participation as an observer state, South Africa’s 
actions on the Council ranged from a selective 
insistence on human rights to the downright 
obstruction of the human rights cause. The 
purpose of this analysis is to briefly present 
evidence of South Africa’s alleged partiality and 
obstructiveness. 
 
Institution-building  
 
The Human Rights Council began its work in July 
2006. The Council’s first year was set aside to 
finalise institutional issues. The Council was 
created to replace and build on the strengths of 
the delegitimised UN Commission on Human 
Rights. However, it soon became clear that the 
main struggle during the Council’s institution-
building period was not over how to improve on 
the Commission, but over how to prevent the 
Council from being made into something weaker 
that its predecessor. The membership structure of 
the Council meant the threat was grave: western 
states had only seven of the 47 seats  while 
Africa and Asia had thirteen each. The Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) further formed 
powerful cross-regional blocs. South Africa was  
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firmly among the numerically superior group who 
advanced a ‘negative reform agenda’, a group 
that included China, Cuba, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Russia, and the OIC states(1).  South Africa’s 
priorities during the institution-building phase 
reflected little consistent for the victims of human 
rights violations, but lay with how states were to 
be treated. South Africa’s constant impulse was 
to give states as much room as possible to evade 
scrutiny of their human rights records. 
 
The Council inherited from the Commission a set 
of ‘special procedures’ that former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan has called the ‘crown jewel’ 
of the UN human rights machinery. Under the 
special procedures mechanism, experts would be 
given mandates to undertake fact-finding 
missions to study the human rights situation in 
specific countries or under certain themes. 
Former UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour, described these experts as 
‘the frontline human rights troops that we turn to 
for early warning and protection,’ persons who 
have ‘given a voice to the often silenced victims 
of human rights abuses’.(2)  However, South 
Africa and the rest of the African group did their 
utmost to weaken the special procedures 
mechanism. These efforts included giving 
member states more control over the way 
mandate holders were appointed and argued that 
no country should be singled out for an 
investigation into its human rights record. Most 
cynically, South Africa supported subjecting 
mandate holders to a ‘code of conduct’, 
ostensibly to increase ‘mutual trust’ between 
states and mandate holders, but in reality to limit 
the independence of special procedures.  
 
A major difference between the Council and the 
former Commission was that the new body would 
include a peer review component, the exact 
nature of which was left to the Council to decide. 
In discussions about what came to be known as 
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), to which all 
UN members would be subject, South Africa was 
prominent in efforts to make the process as 
unthreatening as possible for states. South Africa 
emphasised the cooperative and consensual 
nature of the UPR. South Africa further insisted 
that the assessment process should be state-led, 
which translated into putting each state in charge 
of writing its own report, making state consultation 
with local NGOs optional, and excluding NGOs 
from the review at the international level. 
 
Country-specific human rights issues 
 
During its four years as a member of the Council, 
South Africa repeatedly shielded the governments 
of Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and Sri Lanka from stronger Council 
scrutiny. With regard to North Korea, South Africa 
abstained during the three times it had to vote on 
whether to express deep concern about the 
human rights problems in North Korea; regret at 
the country’s unwillingness to cooperate with the 
Council, and to continue the mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on human rights in the 
country. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, 
Ghana, Madagascar, Mauritius and Zambia all 
voted in favour of the North Korea resolution on at 
least one occasion. South Africa claimed that its 
unwillingness to criticize the aforementioned 
regimes flowed from a principled opposition to the 
singling out of specific countries over their human 
rights records, which, presumably, is also the 
African Group’s position. This reason, however, 
does not hold water. 
 
In addition to the North Korea example above, 
there have been numerous instances of split 
voting among African states on country-specific 
situations (e.g. over Darfur, the DRC and Sri 
Lanka). Moreover, when it comes to Israel, South 
Africa suddenly forgets its dislike for ‘naming and 
shaming’. The Council has a particular obsession 
with Israel – during South Africa’s membership of 
the Council, 27 of the 61 country-specific 
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resolutions dealt with Israel. These resolutions on 
Israel are typically scathing and one-sided, yet 
South Africa has voted for them all. Israel’s 
treatment of the Palestinians is indeed a disgrace, 
but it comes nowhere near the crimes of the 
Sudanese regime.  
 
As mentioned, South Africa and the African 
Group tried to ensure that the Council’s peer 
review process, would give states maximum 
control and reduce the potential for criticism as far 
as possible. Although the African Group did not 
fully achieve its aims, the UPR remains 
unthreatening. Nevertheless, the UPR process 
creates the opportunity to ask tough questions of 
all countries when they appear before the Council 
once every four years. When Western states 
have come up for review, South Africa indeed 
used the opportunity to tersely and directly 
address what appears to be the biggest human 
rights problems in these societies, raising issues 
related to racism, xenophobia, immigration, 
indigenous peoples, sexism, and sexual 
orientation. However, when developing countries 
appeared for review, South Africa almost always 
went easy on them.  South Africa’s usual 
approach has been to lay the gratitude and praise 
on thick, and then make a few timid observations 
which typically steer clear of suggestions that the 
regime under review might be violating political or 
civil rights. 
 
Thematic human rights issues 
 
South Africa has been much more willing to 
speak for victims of human rights abuses when 
the matter is organised under a theme than when 
it is country-specific. However, South Africa’s 
interventions are tainted by various problems, 
many of which stem from its loyalty to values that 
find expression through the present-day NAM, 
particularly the organisation’s emphasis on 
national sovereignty and its tendency to the see 
the world as engaged in a battle between North 
and South. 
 
South Africa has been vocal on matters related to 
racial and religious discrimination. South Africa 
has, for instance, raised important points about 
the discrimination that Muslims in Western 
societies experience. However, South Africa has 
followed the OIC into support for deep restrictions 
on free speech. The most notorious of these 
efforts have the OIC’s presentation of its 
‘defamation of religion’ resolutions, which, while 
acknowledging the right to freedom of expression, 
insists that this rights should be used responsibly 
and that they may limited for the sake of public 
order or out of respect for religions and beliefs. 
Critics have questioned the idea that religions can 
be defamed, and have pointed out that these 
resolutions are open to abuse and would remove 
protections for non-believers, religious minorities 
and political dissidents. The defamation 
resolutions gradually lost support and were not 
presented again in 2011. South Africa, however, 
continued to support the resolution until it was 
discontinued. Apart from Indonesia, an OIC 
member, South Africa was the only Council 
member classified as ‘free’ by Freedom House to 
do so. 
 
South Africa has also been a vocal supporter of 
the right to development and of various economic 
rights. In South Africa’s view, economic rights are 
on a par with political rights. Nevertheless, 
assertions of the right to development and the 
equal status of economic and political rights are 
not unproblematic. If rights entail claims against 
an agent, then who should satisfy the right to 
development? Which political and economic 
rights are we talking about? Is there are a trade-
off?  South Africa seems to accept that there is a 
trade-off. Economic development somehow 
entitles a state to ignore political rights. In its 
comments on Singapore’s UPR presentation, for 
example, South Africa noted Singapore’s socio-
  
4 
The views expressed in news articles and research reports selected for inclusion in the various SAFPI news feeds do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (OSF-SA) or its sponsors. OSF-SA is also not responsible for any 
errors of fact contained in the articles. 
SAFPI Policy Brief No 17 
economic achievements, but kept quiet about the 
curtailment of political freedoms in the city-state. 
In fact, South Africa encouraged Singapore to 
maintain its course(3).  Furthermore, while better-
off states certainly have a duty towards the 
world’s poor, governments of poor countries 
should also govern better. However, South Africa 
seems to place responsibility for realising the 
economic rights of the poor squarely on the 
shoulders of the international community. So, 
during South Africa’s comments on Zimbabwe’s 
UPR presentation, South Africa noted that 
Zimbabwe faces many obstacles to improving its 
human rights situation, among which South Africa 
singled out economic sanctions, rather than the 
repression and disastrous economic policies of 
the Mugabe regime. 
 
Conclusions 
 
South Africa’s support for Resolution 17/19 on 
sexual orientation has been the country’s only act 
on the Council that is unambiguously pro-human 
rights. On the Council, South Africa has often 
obstructed the promotion of human rights, but 
even when it seems to act for human rights, such 
as on issues related to Israel, race, religion or 
socio-economic rights, the country’s stances are 
marred by partiality and selectivity.  
 
Four concluding points flow from the above. First, 
the ability of civil society pressure to get South 
Africa to change its stance on the issue of sexual 
orientation is encouraging. Not many South 
Africans are familiar with what their 
representatives have been doing at the Council. 
This gives the country’s diplomats considerable 
autonomy. Greater dissemination of information 
about South Africa’s actions at the Council and 
more pressure from civil society are likely to 
improve the country’s behaviour at the Council. 
One area of particular embarrassment is South 
Africa’s siding with the Islamic bloc in support of 
various resolutions and endeavours to deeply 
limit free speech.  
 
Second, South Africa should retreat from its 
loyalty to the NAM. The fact that the 
organisation’s last three chairs have come from 
Cuba, Egypt and Iran suggest that the promotion 
of human rights is not high on this body’s list of 
priorities.  
 
Third, at the Council, South Africa seems to 
interpret African solidarity as shielding all 
regimes, irrespective of how they treat their 
citizens. At the Council, Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Mauritius and especially Zambia have shown that 
African solidarity could also mean loyalty to the 
ordinary people of Africa, and not necessarily 
their governments. This latter understanding of 
African solidarity is the morally correct one to 
adopt.  
 
Fourth, there was a time when South Africa was 
seen as an independent voice in international 
relations, which allowed it to ‘punch above its 
weight’. At the Council, the sexual orientation 
resolution was the only time South Africa acted 
with real independence – on other occasions it 
clings to what the conservative positions in the 
African Group or the NAM. For instance, during 
South Africa’s four years as member of the 
Council, it never once voted with the bulk of the 
European states on an issue that was 
substantially split (defined as two or more 
members abstaining or voting against a 
resolution). South Africa’s lack of independence 
undermines its credibility in international affairs. 
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